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abstRact: This article concerns whether Nietzsche is sympathetic to monism about 
concrete objects, the heterodox metaphysical view that there is exactly one con-
crete object. I first dispel prominent reasons for thinking that Nietzsche rejects 
monism. I then develop the most compelling arguments for monism in Nietzsche’s 
writings and check for soundness. The arguments seem to be supported by the 
texts, but they have not been developed in the literature. Despite such arguments, 
I suggest that Nietzsche is actually not sympathetic to monism about objects—but 
his reasons for siding against monism are not at all obvious. The result should be 
a new understanding of some of Nietzsche’s fundamental ontological 
commitments.
Nietzsche’s view of concrete objects is difficult to pin down, and commen-
tators have offered widely different accounts.1 This paper concerns whether 
Nietzsche is sympathetic to monism about concrete objects. Of course, there 
are many varieties of monism. They share in attributing oneness to some-
thing. Nietzsche appears to embrace oneness in some important sense when 
he notes, “Thinking is an action which takes apart what is really one” (KSA 
11:40[38]). But what exactly is one? Many readers argue that Nietzsche is 
committed to substance monism, the view that all concrete objects fall under 
1 For the reading that Nietzsche thinks objects are socially constructed, see Nehamas 1985; 
Anderson 1998; Cox 1999; Remhof 2015. For the reading that objects have intrinsic natures, 
see Hales and Welshon 2000; Doyle 2009. For a commonsense realist reading, see Clark 1990; 
Leiter 1994. For the reading that objects do not exist, see Nola 1987; Meyer 2014, 218–219.
Justin Remhof is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Old Dominion University. His 
primary areas of research are nineteenth-century philosophy and metaphysics. He is the 
author of Nietzsche’s Constructivism: A Metaphysics of Material Objects (Routledge, 2017), and 
his work has appeared in journals such as European Journal of Philosophy, History of Philosophy 
Quarterly, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Nietzsche-Studien, and others.
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one particular type or kind, specifically “will to power.”2 Generally, this view 
holds that all objects are of the type force, such that all objects are bundles 
of forces. Whether Nietzsche embraces this position, and what the position 
amounts to, has been debated for decades. My interest largely lies 
elsewhere.
I want to examine whether Nietzsche is sympathetic to object monism, 
the heterodox metaphysical view that there is exactly one concrete object. 
Object monism can be differentiated into existence monism and priority 
monism. Existence monism holds that exactly one concrete object exists: 
the world. On this view, the world is an object with enormous structural 
complexity and variability, but with no genuine parts. As a result, there are 
no other objects but the world. Alternatively, priority monism holds that 
exactly one basic concrete object exists, and other objects, if they exist, are 
derivative parts of the one basic object. On this view, objects such as trees, 
chairs, and planets, if they exist, are parts of the world as a whole.
Historically, existence monism has been associated with Parmenides, 
Melissus, and Spinoza, and priority monism has been linked to, among 
others, Plato, Spinoza, Hegel, and Royce. But neither monist view has been 
attributed to Nietzsche. In fact, it does not even occur to most commentators 
that Nietzsche could be an object monist.3 However, two prominent think-
ers have recently associated Nietzsche with such a position. John Richardson 
says that on Nietzsche’s account there is reason to think “only one entity” 
exists (2015, 90), and Galen Strawson says that there is some evidence to 
suppose that Nietzsche believes that “reality is one” (2015, 10) in the sense 
that Nietzsche might be a “‘thing-monist’” (13). Unfortunately, neither 
commentator explores Nietzsche’s relation to object monism in detail—
both drop the issue and move on to other things. But I want to know 
whether there are good reasons for thinking that Nietzsche embraces 
monism about objects.
And there do seem to be. After Nietzsche claims that “Thinking is an 
action which takes apart what is really one,” for example, he remarks, 
“Nothing is ever ‘added’ in reality, nor is anything ever ‘divided’; two 
2 See, e.g., Danto 1965, 216–218; Schacht 1983, ch. 4; Deleuze 1983, 86; Schrift 1995, 
42; Poellner 1995, 240; Richardson 1996; Hales and Welshon 1999, 348; Doyle 2009; 
Strawson 2015, 10–11. Hussain (2004) holds that Nietzsche adopts Mach’s neutral monism, 
which is a substance monist position that does not hold that all objects are of the type will to 
power. Schopenhauer, perhaps Nietzsche’s most significant influence, is clearly committed to 
substance monism—all objects are of the type will.
3 For example, prominent works on Nietzsche’s metaphysics, such as Schacht 1983; 
Richardson 1996; Poellner 1996; Cox 1999; Hales and Welshon 2000; and Doyle 2009, 
never investigate Nietzsche’s relation to object monism.
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halves of a thing are not the same as a whole” (KSA 11:40[38]).4 Notice 
that substance monism cannot make sense of this passage. Nietzsche is not 
saying that no types or kinds of objects can be added or divided from the 
whole. He is instead suggesting that nothing can be added or divided from 
some one thing which constitutes the whole of reality. Existence or priority 
monism might very well make good sense of this view.
The primary aim of this paper is to develop the most compelling argu-
ments for object monism in Nietzsche’s writings and check for soundness. 
In section 1, I address prominent reasons for thinking that Nietzsche rejects 
monism. I suggest that those reasons, in fact, do not stand in the way of 
reading as an object monist. Sectionss 2 and 3 reconstruct arguments for 
thinking that Nietzsche embraces existence monism and priority monism, 
respectively. Each argument seems to be supported by the texts, but neither 
have been developed in the literature. Despite such arguments, I suggest that 
Nietzsche is actually not sympathetic to existence or priority monism—but his 
reasons for siding against monism are not at all straightforward. This paper 
therefore highlights an ontological alternative that, for the most part, lies 
buried in Nietzsche’s work and has not been discussed, and brings that alter-
native into the light of day for critical analysis. The result should be a new 
understanding of some of Nietzsche’s fundamental ontological commitments.
4 This translation is in part due to Hill via personal correspondence. My thanks to him 
for the help. To be sure that this notebook passage at least appears to present evidence that 
Nietzsche might be sympathetic to object monism, let me quote the notebook entry in full in 
and offer a more detailed reading. Here is the passage:
It is important to characterize correctly the unity in which thinking, feeling, and all 
affects are summarized: obviously the intellect is only a tool, but in whose hands? 
Certainly, the affects. And these are a multiplicity, behind which it is not necessary 
to establish a unity: it suffices to regard it as a regency. That the organs have devel-
oped everywhere, as morphological development shows, may certainly be used as an 
analogy for the spiritual: so that something “new” can always only be grasped by the 
exertion of a single force from a synthetic force.
Thinking is an action which takes apart what is really one. Everywhere there is the ap-
pearance that there are countable varieties, even in thought. Nothing is ever “added” 
in reality, nor is anything ever “divided”; two halves of a thing are not the same as a 
whole (KSA 11:40[38]).
The passage begins by discussing the correct description of the unity of thinking, willing, and 
feeling. Nietzsche holds that thought is a tool of the affects, that there are multiple affects, 
and that there is no need to impose a unity on that multiplicity. In the second part of the 
passage, Nietzsche claims that thought renders multiple what really exists as a unity, and this 
process supplies the appearance of multiplicity. Here is how this passage seems to support 
object monism, particularly existence monism. Existence monism holds that the world con-
tains multiplicity, but also that such multicity does not imply that the world has proper parts, 
despite appearances to the contrary. This seems to support Nietzsche’s claim that multiplicity 
exists—for example, the “affects” are “a multiplicity”—but in fact “reality” is “really one.” 
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me to be clear about these interpretive issues.
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Before beginning, I want to say up front that much of this paper utilizes 
material from Nietzsche’s notebooks. The notes are where Nietzsche’s most 
noticeable statements concerning monism arise, which makes sense given 
that the notebooks contain some of his most interesting thoughts on meta-
physics. Indeed, it is more or less standard for works that focus on Nietzsche’s 
metaphysics to focus on the notebooks. I follow this practice. Opening the 
notebooks suits the project at hand. I should add that in a letter to Franz 
Overbeck dated July 2, 1885, Nietzsche writes, “I often feel ashamed that I 
have said so much in public already, that should have never been put in front 
on an ‘audience,’ even in more worthy and deeper times.” This suggests that 
there might be reason to think that Nietzsche kept some of his preferred 
positions unpublished. Some of those positions could very well involve his 
best metaphysical insights, and I think they deserve our attention.5
1. HOW COULD NIETZSCHE BE AN OBJECT MONIST?
There are two immediate objections to reading Nietzsche as an object 
monist. These objections might explain why commentators typically ignore 
the idea that Nietzsche could endorse monism. The first objection is that 
Nietzsche appears to claim that monist views are essentially associated with 
nihilism. Consider the following:
Nihilism as a psychological condition arises when man imagines that there is a 
wholeness, a system, even an organization to all that occurs, so that the mind, 
longing for something to admire and worship, revels in the general idea of a 
supreme form of governance and administration (if it is the mind of a logician, 
perfect consistency and objective dialectic will suffice to reconcile it to every-
thing). When man believes in a kind of unity, in some form of ‘monism,’ he feels 
a profound sense of relation to and dependence upon a whole that is infinitely 
superior to him, and feels himself to be a mode of the divine. ‘The greater 
good demands the surrender of the individual . . .’ but lo and behold, there is 
no greater good! In essence, man loses all belief in his own worth if there is no 
whole of infinite worth encompassing him, no power working through him; or, 
to put it differently, he conceived of such a whole in order to prop up his own 
sense of self-worth. (KSA 13:11[99])
Nietzsche points out that human beings often take themselves to be valu-
able because they believe that the world exhibits some sort of unity that 
supports such value.6 Spinoza, for example, holds that we find value when 
5 For approaches to Nietzsche’s philosophy that typically steer clear of the notebooks, see 
Clark 1990; Leiter 2002.
6 For the view that Nietzsche’s attack on monism here can be levelled against Schelling, 
see Emden 2014, 159.
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we come to know that all events necessarily follow from the essence of mat-
ter and thought in accordance with universal laws determined by God. 
Value comes from contemplating the whole with reverent, intellectual equa-
nimity. Nietzsche believes that no such whole exists: “there is no overarch-
ing unity in the diversity of events” (KSA 13:11[99]). The world fails to 
exhibit the kind of unity that would support the manifestation of values 
those like Spinoza seek. The nihilistic view that human beings cannot find 
themselves valuable follows.
To determine whether this argument challenges object monism we need 
to understand what kind of unity Nietzsche denies exists and why. The 
answer is that Nietzsche rejects unity posited to support axiological positions 
that, for some reason or another, he finds problematic, such as Spinoza’s 
position that intellectual equanimity constitutes a life of value. Nietzsche’s 
criticism of unity therefore turns on what ethical positions unity supports. 
Consequently, it would be a mistake to think that Nietzsche rejects monism 
as nihilistic tout court. There is room for him to embrace a positive view of 
monism.
Additionally, Nietzsche claims that the kind of monism philosophers 
like Spinoza offer us is nihilistic because the “whole world” is “becom-
ing” (KSA 13:11[99]). “Underneath all becoming,” he says, “there is no 
great unity by virtue of which the individual might become a part of a 
larger whole, as if he were completely immersing himself in an element of 
supreme value” (KSA 13:11[99]). The claim that the world as a whole is 
“becoming” certainly seems to support some version of monism, though 
it is unclear whether this includes object monism. The important point is 
that Nietzsche not only appears to differentiate nihilistic from non-nihilistic 
forms of monism, but even embraces the latter. Indeed, readers familiar 
with Nietzsche’s texts know he boldly proclaims that the world as a whole 
is “becoming,” “chaos,” or “will to power,” all of which are meant to 
avoid nihilism in some manner. He says the “whole world” is “becoming” 
(KSA 13:11[99]); “The total character of the world . . . is for all eternity 
chaos” (GS 109); and “This world is the will to power—and nothing besides!” (KSA 
11:38[12], cf. BGE 36). I want to know whether such statements support 
monism about concrete objects.
This brings us to the second objection. In Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the 
Greeks (1872), an unpublished but important early work, Nietzsche rejects 
Parmenidean “being,” more specifically the monist view that “there is only 
unity” (PT 10), and praises Heraclitus’s non-Parmenidean view that the 
world is “becoming” (PT 9). Parmenides is even said to be the “counter-im-
age” of Heraclitus (PT 9). Since Nietzsche’s rejection of Parmenides and 
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endorsement of Heraclitus remains unwavering in future writings, it seems 
strange to think that Nietzsche would endorse a monism of “becoming.”
What, exactly, is Nietzsche’s criticism of Parmenidean monism? Nietzsche 
holds the naturalist position that sense experience is an essential criterion of 
truth (see BGE 134), and, following Heraclitus, he believes that sense experi-
ence reveals that the world undergoes wholesale change (see TI “Reason” 2). 
On Nietzsche’s reading, Parmenides offers a monist view incompatible with 
such change, and therefore denies the significance of sensory information: “All 
sense perceptions, says Parmenides, yield but illusions” (PT 10). Parmenidean 
monism fails because it does not account for naturalist constraints on inquiry. 
Nietzsche therefore writes, “When one makes as total a judgment as does 
Parmenides about the whole of the world, one ceases to be a scientist” (PT 
10). This criticism of Parmenides can be turned into an objection regarding 
Nietzsche’s monist sympathies. When Nietzsche claims that the world as a 
whole is “becoming,” “chaos,” or “will to power,” it could be argued that he 
violates naturalist constraints on inquiry. After all, such proclamations appear to 
be wild metaphysical pronouncements outside the possibility of empirical ver-
ification. Perhaps commitment to object monism is one such pronouncement.
But maybe not. If the arguments for reading Nietzsche as a monist rely on 
premises that require no empirical verification for their plausibility, and no bet-
ter arguments can be found, then Nietzsche will fall to the criticism. My view 
is that he escapes the objection. To see why, we must turn to those arguments.
2. NIETZSCHE AND EXISTENCE MONISM
The first object monist position to consider is existence monism.7 This view 
holds that the world is the only concrete object in existence. Although there 
are no proper parts to the world, though, the world does contain various 
structures and spatiotemporal regions. To formalize existence monism, let 
‘C’ be the property of being a concrete object. Then we have: ∃x (Cx & 
∀y[Cy → x=y]). Existence monism contrasts with existence pluralism, the 
view that at least two distinct concrete objects exist. Existence pluralism 
looks like this: ∃x∃y (Cx & Cy & x≠y). Before looking at an argument for 
existence monism, we should add a quick word about truth. Existence 
monists hold that truth claims only directly apply to the world as a whole. 
But existence monists need not throw out the truth predicate for everyday 
discourse. For example, they might believe that claims about various struc-
tures and spatiotemporal regions of the world can be approximately true. 
7 The formulations of existence monism and priority monism, which begin sections 2 and 
3 of the paper, respectively, are indebted to Schaffer 2016.
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And, importantly, Nietzsche appears to adopt an approximate notion of 
truth that could be leveled to support this position (see BGE 34). But I will 
pass over this issue because we are targeting bigger fish.8 Does Nietzsche 
really believe that the world is the only concrete object in existence?
Nietzsche might very well endorse what is perhaps the best argument for 
existence monism. The argument holds that we can provide a complete 
account of worldly phenomena by positing only the existence of the world—
no further objects are needed. Here is the argument9:
EM1. The world is the only concrete object needed to explain how the world 
causally develops.
EM2. If so, then: if there were proper parts of the world, they would be explan-
atorily redundant entities.
EM3. There are no explanatorily redundant entities.
EM4. So, the world has no proper parts.
The first premise—the truth or falsity of which is certainly empirically 
verifiable—holds that the world’s concrete nature can provide a complete 
causal explanation of worldly events, assuming that we can supply the 
principles that govern the world’s development. This explanation does 
not require reference to any proper parts of the world, such as cats and 
dogs, tables and chairs, or planets and moons. For example, consider a 
Newtonian world containing what we would typically describe as a soccer 
ball bouncing off a goalpost. All that is needed to explain this event is the 
world’s occupational state relative to Newtonian configuration space and 
principles such as F=ma. Such principles only provide information about 
relations between certain properties in space over time. They say nothing 
about which concrete objects exist. As a result, the soccer ball and the 
goalpost are not required to explain the event. The world alone supplies 
sufficient causal information.
Does Nietzsche endorse EM1? He does note that “All events, all motion, 
[and] all becoming” are “a determination of degrees and relations of force” 
(KSA 12:9[91], cf. GM II:12). Events, motion, and becoming should be 
understood as causal phenomena. Nietzsche suggests that such phenomena 
can be explained fully in terms of force. This is not Newtonian force, how-
ever, but force he calls “will to power.” Newton construes force in terms of 
fundamental material substance. Nietzsche famously follows Boscovich in 
conceiving force to be physical and fundamental, such that material 
8 For a treatment of Nietzsche’s approximate view of truth, see Remhof 2016. For a 
treatment of how a contemporary version of existence monism treats truth, see Horgan and 
Potrč 2000.
9 I adopt this from Schaffer 2016.
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properties emerge from relations between forces.10 For Nietzsche, material 
properties emerge from bundles of heterogeneous forces, or what he calls a 
“complex of events” (KSA 12:9[91]). On Nietzsche’s view, a causal event 
conceived as will to power can be modeled as this: <α → є → β>, where α 
and β are bundles of forces and є is a directed energy transfer between α 
and β.11 Causal events consist in force transferring from one bundle to 
another. No concrete entities like tables or chairs require mention. Provided 
that “all events, all motion, [and] all becoming” are “a determination of 
degrees and relations of force,” then, it seems that all worldly phenomena 
can be explained with this basic principle.
Does Nietzsche think the world is the only object needed to explain the 
world’s causal development? Perhaps yes, despite the fact that he never 
explicitly says so. Here is my reconstruction of his argument. According to 
Nietzsche, bundles of forces are wholly relational. Specifically, their contex-
tual relations with all other bundles constitute their nature. He notes, “[a 
bundle’s] essence lies in [its] relation to all other [bundles]” (KSA 13:14[79], 
cf. 13:14[153], 13:14[154]). The nature of every bundle depends on, and is 
depended on by, the nature of every other bundle. Call this position 
Contextual Constitution.12 On this view, no entities in the world have an 
independently determinate nature. Only the world as a whole has such a 
nature.13 And Nietzsche identifies reality with the whole: “Reality consists 
precisely in this particular action and reaction of every individual toward 
the whole” (KSA 13:14[184], cf. PT 5).14 Altogether, Nietzsche appears to 
believe that the world is a determinately structured whole that can be fully 
explained vis-á-vis causal relations between bundles of forces in accordance 
with a particular principle concerning force. Bundles supply vast structural 
variability and complexity, but independent bundles are not needed to 
explain worldly phenomena—all that is needed is the determinately struc-
tured whole. This provides good reason to think that Nietzsche endorses 
EM1, the claim that the world as a whole is the only object needed to 
explain how the world causally develops.
EM2 holds that if the world is the only concrete object needed to explain 
how the world causally develops, then: if there were proper parts of the 
world, they would be explanatorily redundant entities. This premise should 
be uncontroversial. If the world provides a sufficient explanation for the 
causal development of all worldly phenomena, as Nietzsche appears to 
10 See Boscovich 1922.
11 I adopt this from Welshon 2004, 174.
12 See Remhof 2015, 300.
13 Richardson (2015, 90) points this out as well.
14 “Individual” should not be understood as a proper part, of course, but rather some 
organization of bundle of forces or another.
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think, then the proper parts of the world could only function to explain 
what has already been explained. In this sense, the parts would be explan-
atorily redundant.
EM3, the final premise, claims that there are no explanatorily redundant 
entities. This claim is best defended on methodological grounds, particularly 
Occam’s razor. A common reading of Occam’s razor holds that explanato-
rily redundant entities should be discarded. Does Nietzsche endorse such a 
principle? Clark and Dudrick (2012, 160) have rightly identified an import-
ant place in Nietzsche’s texts where Occam’s razor makes an appearance, 
and the context even concerns the explanatory power of force. In BGE 12, 
Nietzsche praises Boscovich for attacking the Newtonian view that hard, 
extended atoms comprise fundamental reality. Nietzsche proceeds to claim 
that “we must still go further and declare war,” specifically “a ruthless war 
of the knife” [einen schonungslosen Krieg auf’s Messer] (BGE 12, my translation), 
on our need to posit similar atomistic views about the soul. Boscovich holds 
that material reality can be fully explained in terms of force, which ren-
ders Newtonian entities superfluous. Nietzsche’s endorsement of Boscovich 
includes support for Occam’s razor.
More support for the principle can be garnered from BGE 36. I will not 
address whether the passage does or does not support some metaphysical 
thesis concerning the will to power.15 I merely want to show that Occam’s 
razor makes an appearance in Nietzsche’s proposed line of argument, what-
ever that argument might be intended to show.
BGE 36 starts with the conjecture, “Suppose nothing else were ‘given’ 
as real except our world of desires and passions, and we could not get 
down, or up, to any other ‘reality’ besides the reality of our drives.” This 
suggests a project: “Is it not permitted to make the experiment and to 
ask the question whether this ‘given’ would not be sufficient to render the 
so-called mechanistic (and thus material) world comprehensible as well?” 
(my translation). And, significantly, Nietzsche thinks this experiment is not 
optional: “not only is it permitted to make the experiment; conscience of 
method demands it.” This method, I suggest, involves rejecting explanatorily 
redundant entities.
Nietzsche continues by saying that if we “recognize the will as efficient ... 
then we have to make the experiment of positing the causality of the will 
15 For those who deny that in BGE 36 Nietzsche embraces a metaphysical thesis concern-
ing will to power, see Clark 1990; Leiter 2002; Clark and Dudrick 2012. For those who take 
Nietzsche to embrace a metaphysical thesis concerning the will to power in BGE 36, see 
Schacht 2000; Welshon 2004.
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hypothetically as the only one,” and concludes with a statement about will 
to power as the only efficient causal force:
Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the 
development and ramification of one basic form of the will—namely, of the will 
to power, as my proposition has it; suppose all organic functions could be traced 
back to this will to power . . . then one would have gained the right to determine 
all efficient force univocally as—will to power. The world viewed from inside, 
defined and determined according to its “intelligible character”—it would be 
“will to power” and nothing else.
In brief, the passage proposes that if a willed drive event can be understood 
as an instance of an efficient causal event conceived as will to power, then, 
after successfully generalizing into other domains, all efficient causal events 
might be justifiably modeled as will to power. How might this work?16 The 
answer turns on structural isomorphism. A willed drive event can be under-
stood as an affective directed transfer of energy from subject to intentional 
object: <subject → affect → intentional object>. For example, my love of 
soccer involves me as subject, love as affect, and soccer as object. We have 
seen that a will to power event, or a causal event concerning force, has an 
isomorphic form: <α → є → β>. The triadic structure of a causal event 
conceived as will to power is isomorphic to the structure of a willed drive 
event. If this isomorphism extends to events beyond the domain of psychol-
ogy, Nietzsche suggests, then eventually we should be permitted to conclude 
that all efficient causal events are most basically due to the operation of 
interacting bundles of forces. Hence, Nietzsche offers the will to power as 
the single explanatory principle for all worldly phenomena.17 This certainly 
appears to be a powerful endorsement of Occam’s razor.
In sum, Nietzsche seems to believe that (EM1) the world is the only con-
crete object needed to explain how the world causally develops; (EM2) if so, 
then: if there were proper parts of the world, they would be explanatorily 
redundant entities; and (EM3) there are no explanatorily redundant entities. 
The existence monist conclusion follows: (EM4) the world has no proper 
parts. This conclusion might appear counterintuitive, but at the same time 
the premises do not seem unreasonable.
Nearly all commentators read Nietzsche as an existence pluralist. But 
how might they respond to the argument? One response is to deny EM2 
by claiming that composition is identity. To say composition is identity is to 
say that there are proper parts of the world, but they are not explanatorily 
16 What follows is indebted to Welshon 2004.
17 Danto (1965, 216–18) calls this position “Methodological Monism.” Grimm (1977, 169) 
rightly points out that methodological monism is compatible with there being vast structural 
complexity to the world.
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redundant, since the parts that compose the world and the world itself 
are identical. Indeed, directly before Nietzsche notes that “Reality consists 
precisely in this particular action and reaction of every individual toward 
the whole,” he claims that “‘world’ is only a word for the totality of these 
actions” (KSA 13:14[184]). ‘World’ seems to refer to the totality, and the 
totality appears to be identical to the actions that compose the totality.
Unfortunately, this notebook passage sits in tension with another pas-
sage that suggests composition is not identity. Recall, Nietzsche notes that 
“Nothing is ever ‘added’ in reality, nor is anything ever ‘divided’; two 
halves of a thing are not the same as a whole” (KSA 11:40[38]). If “two 
halves of a thing are not the same as a whole,” then by Leibniz’s law the 
parts and the whole are not identical—they are either structurally distinct, 
numerically distinct, or both. The current existence pluralist response is 
therefore lacking. A solid response should contribute to explaining away 
passages that appear to support monism.
Those who consider Nietzsche to be an existence pluralist might do bet-
ter by going after EM1, the claim that the world is the only concrete object 
needed to explain how the world causally develops. One might argue that 
proper parts are indeed needed to explain the world’s causal development. 
First, let us take a closer look at Contextual Constitution, the view that 
bundles of forces are contextually constituted through their relations to 
other bundles. Importantly, Nietzsche thinks we are particular bundles of 
forces, specifically in the form of drives and affects (see BGE 12). And he 
gives us a unique power in relation to other bundles: we can organize them 
into proper objects. He writes, “A thing = its qualities; but these equal 
everything which matters to us about that thing; a unity under which we 
collect the relations that may be of some account to us” (KSA 12:2[77]; cf. GS 
58). Following Boscovich, Nietzsche believes the “qualities” or properties 
we organize into objects are the perceivable effects of microscopic interac-
tions among forces, such that the properties that constitute objects are 
ultimately constituted by relations among forces. Objects are unities of 
properties, properties are the perceivable effects of force relations, and uni-
fication of such effects occurs through the application of concepts. Thus, 
Nietzsche says “A ‘thing’ is the sum of its effects, synthetically united by a 
concept” (KSA 13:14[98]). It is even “enough to create new names,” he 
asserts, “to create new ‘things’” (GS 58). Our ability to conceptually orga-
nize properties implies that we have the power to construct objects.18
18 For a detailed discussion of this constructivist view of objects in Nietzsche, including 
arguments against alternative readings and responses to possible objections, see Remhof 
2017.
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This constructivist conception of objects requires a subtler view of 
Nietzsche’s ontological commitments. Contextual Constitution implies both 
that all bundles of forces are ontologically interdependent and that some 
bundles are ontologically independent of others. Some bundles are onto-
logically independent of others because some are genuine objects, con-
structed through the conceptual organization of properties, and some are 
not objects—some bundles merely comprise nonunified structures or fill 
various spatiotemporal regions. There is an ontologically significant dif-
ference between proper objects and mere forces. When Nietzsche claims 
that “Reality consists precisely in this particular action and reaction of every 
individual toward the whole” (KSA 13:14[184]), then, we need to remem-
ber that not all actions and reactions are ontologically on a par with others. 
Some form genuine objects, and some do not.
Additionally, Nietzsche believes that the causal principle concerning 
force leveled to explain worldly phenomena involves the construction of 
proper objects. The existence of various worldly structures or spatiotempo-
ral regions will not suffice. Force functions, such as <α → є → β>, are 
purely formal. As such, Nietzsche thinks they offer a mere “theory of signs,” 
by which he means that “reality is nowhere to be found in them” (TI 
“Reason” 3). Nietzsche believes that we must “accept the evidence of the 
senses” for formulas like force functions to refer to reality (TI “Reason” 3). 
We embrace sensory evidence by interpreting symbols as certain kinds of 
bundles of forces (e.g., we take α and β to concern planets and moons) and 
identifying individual bundles of forces instantiated by those kinds (e.g., we 
take α as Jupiter and β as Europa).19 Using interpretation and identification, 
we can begin to offer causal explanations of worldly phenomena using 
force. And, of course, these explanations require organizing the world into 
objects, rather than relying on mere relations between properties in space 
over time. For Nietzsche, logical and mathematical functions are “a means 
and measure for us to create reality” (KSA 12:9[97]),20 specifically objects. 
Since applying force functions in causal explanations requires the creation 
of objects, proper parts of the world are needed to explain how the world 
causally develops. Hence, EM1 is false.
Notice that this existence pluralist reading is perfectly consistent with 
Nietzsche’s remarks concerning monism. Nietzsche claims that “‘world’ is 
only a word for the totality of [this particular action and reaction of every 
individual toward the whole]” (KSA 13:14[184]). An existence pluralist 
19 For further discussion of interpretation and identification, see Giere 1998, 74–76; 2006, 
62. For further discussion of these notions in Nietzsche, see Remhof 2015, 307–8.
20 Cf. HH I: 11, 19; GS 111, 121; BGE 4, 21.
481NIETZSCHE ON MONISM ABOUT OBJECTS
hears this: the world itself can be taken as an object provided that we use 
the concept ‘world’ to unify the totality of properties that emerge from 
interacting bundles of forces. And the world’s being a constructed object in 
no way implies that the world is the only constructed object.
Nietzsche also says, “Nothing is ever ‘added’ in reality, nor is anything 
ever ‘divided’; two halves of a thing are not the same as a whole” (KSA 
11:40[38]). The first clause suggests that nothing can be added or divided 
from a single object, namely, the world. But this need not imply existence 
monism. The best reason for thinking that nothing can be added to the 
world is that the world is a fixed totality of bundles of forces. This is consis-
tent with existence pluralism because, as I have argued, only some bundles 
are objects. The best reason for thinking that nothing can be divided from 
the world is that forces form an ontologically interdependent whole. This 
is also consistent with existence pluralism. I argued above that bundles 
are ontologically interdependent and nonetheless differentiated into objects. 
Finally, as I have already suggested, Nietzsche’s claim that “two halves of 
a thing are not the same as a whole” (KSA 11:40[38]) seems warranted 
because he believes composition is not identity. An object can be identified 
as some unified group of properties apart from the properties that compose 
the group. The existence pluralist has no problem with this. The entire 
passage, then, is easily compatible with existence pluralism.
3. NIETZSCHE AND PRIORITY MONISM
I have argued that existence pluralism is better supported by the texts than 
existence monism. But perhaps Nietzsche embraces a version of concrete 
object monism that allows for pluralities of objects. One such historically 
influential view is priority monism. According to priority monism, exactly 
one basic concrete object exists, and other objects, if they exist, are deriva-
tive parts of the one basic object. The one basic object is typically regarded 
as the world and objects such as trees and leaves, cats and dogs, and planets 
and moons are said to be derivative parts of the world. To formalize prior-
ity monism, let ‘B’ denote the property of being a basic concrete object. We 
then get this: ∃x (Bx & ∀y[By → x=y]). Priority monism directly contrasts 
with priority pluralism, which holds that there are at least two basic objects. 
Priority pluralism looks like this: ∃x∃y(Bx & By & x≠y). Finally, at least on 
the face of things, priority monism is consistent with existence pluralism, 
since existence pluralism concerns concrete objects in general, rather than 
basic concrete objects. But existence pluralists often claim that there are 
no priority relations among the plurality of concrete objects. In this case, 
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existence pluralism clashes with priority monism (and, of course, priority 
pluralism).
I have already indicated the first motivation for thinking Nietzsche might 
embrace priority monism: he appears to make statements that support 
monism about wholeness and pluralism about parts. The second reason is 
that he appears to accept a priority relation between the world and worldly 
parts. Priority designates hierarchy, which is typically understood as an 
irreflexive and transitive relation. For priority monists, there is an irreflex-
ive and transitive relation between a single basic object and pluralities of 
nonbasic objects, such that those objects are grounded in, and existent only 
in virtue of, the single basic object.
There are two passages Nietzsche’s notebooks that appear to support 
priority monism. The first we have seen numerous times: “Thinking is an 
action which takes apart what is really one,” and “two halves of a thing 
are not the same as a whole” (KSA 11:40[38]). Reality seems to be “really 
one,” or a single whole, and the fact that the halves do not constitute the 
whole could be leveled to support irreflexivity and transitivity between the 
whole and its parts. More textual evidence occurs in the following famous 
notebook entry:
And do you know what I take ‘the world’ to be? Shall I hold my mirror up to it? 
This world is a monster of force, without beginning or end, a fixed and invari-
able magnitude of force, no more, no less, which is never expended, merely 
transformed, of unalterable size as a whole, whose budget is without either ex-
penses or losses, but likewise without gains or earnings, surrounded and bounded 
by ‘nothingness’; it is nothing indefinite or dispersed, nothing infinitely ex-
tended, but rather a determinate amount of force set in a determinate space and 
not a space which would be ‘empty’ anywhere, but on the contrary a space ev-
erywhere filled with force, a play of forces and waves of forces, simultaneously 
the One and ‘Many’, waxing here and waning there, an ocean of tempestuous 
and torrential forces, forever changing, forever rolling back, with enormous pe-
riods of recurrence, with an ebb and f low of its configurations, bringing forth 
the most complex from the simplest, the most fiery, fierce and self-contradictory 
from the most still, rigid and cold and then from this profusion returning again 
to simplicity . . . This world is the will to power—and nothing besides! And even 
you yourselves are this will to power—and nothing besides! (KSA 11:38[12])21
First, notice that many of these claims could be verified by the sciences. 
For example, Nietzsche’s claim that the world is a “fixed and invariable 
magnitude of force” brings to mind the law of conservation of energy, 
and his claim that the world contains no “space which would be ‘empty’ 
21 Hill translates ‘Kraft’ as ‘energy,’ whereas I translate it as ‘force.’
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anywhere” is long-debated by physicists. Thus, the passage does not seem 
to overstep the constraints of naturalism.
The passage appears to support priority monism. Nietzsche says that the 
world is “simultaneously the One and ‘Many.’” The world considered as 
one is the fundamental whole comprised of force (“will to power”). The whole 
has many parts that Nietzsche suggests are grounded in, and existent only in 
virtue of, the fundamental whole. Objects are comprised by the “ebb and 
flow of [the world’s] configurations” in the sense that the “most complex” 
derive from the “simplest.” This certainly appears to support some version 
of priority monism.
However, I think there is reason to question this reading. Recall that 
Nietzsche believes objects are groups of conceptually unified properties. 
This commitment has crucial consequences for understanding how he could 
be a priority monist. He would need to claim that taking the world to be 
a single object, specifically an object identical to all properties that emerge 
from interacting bundles of forces, depends on how we conceptualize expe-
rience. The same dependency relation between our practices and experi-
ence must hold for the world to be a single basic object—and again if objects 
such as trees and leaves are derivative parts of the world. To be a priority 
monist Nietzsche would therefore need to say that we take there to be 
exactly one fundamental object from which all other objects derive.
Here is the problem with this picture. Priority monists from antiquity 
to today predominantly assume words like ‘single,’ ‘basic,’ and ‘derivative,’ 
when applied to the concrete world, pick out mind-independent features 
of reality. But Nietzsche rejects such mind-independence. On his view, 
concepts do not reflect objects or relations between objects with determi-
nate properties divorced from our practices. Rather, objects and relations 
between objects gain determinate properties through our practical activities. 
Objects—single or otherwise—exist when bundles of forces are conceptually 
organized in certain ways. Likewise, the state of affairs in which some object 
is basic to, ontologically prior to, or derivative of some other object exists 
when bundles of forces are conceptually organized in those ways. Relations 
like ‘basic’ and ‘derivative’ emerge with the construction of the relata. Such 
terms are concepts that we determine to have particular conditions of appli-
cation. We have seen that for Nietzsche the application conditions of our 
concepts fix the properties of objects, which then fixes the property relations 
between objects. Determinately structured objects, and hence determinately 
structured relations between objects, depend on our practices.
This analysis enables us to better understand the long notebook passage 
above that seems to support priority monism. Taken alone, the passage 
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is neutral between the traditional, mind-independent version of priority 
monism and the nontraditional, mind-dependent version. But the nontra-
ditional reading can make good sense of the text. The world is “simulta-
neously the One and ‘Many’” because we take ‘world’ to refer to a single 
object identical to the totality of forces, and objects such as trees and leaves 
are conceptually unified bundles of forces derived from that totality. We 
shape the “ebb and flow of [the world’s] configurations” into objects that 
stand in certain relations to other objects, perhaps even the world as a 
whole.
The takeaway is that although Nietzsche’s view of objects is inconsistent 
with existence monism, it can be rendered consistent with priority monism. 
But there is a crucial caveat. Insofar as priority monists deny the construc-
tive power of our activities—and this denial is likely uniform22—priority 
monists and Nietzsche go their separate ways. Nietzsche’s view that we 
create objects puts the referents of ‘priority’ and ‘monist’ in our hands. If 
Nietzsche were a priority monist, then, he would most certainly be the 
apple furthest from the tree—so much so, I think, that such a reading is 
implausible.
This conclusion does not mean that Nietzsche is better read as a priority 
pluralist. There are two connected reasons for this. First, the remarks he 
makes which suggest that something in reality is basic, or exhibits the prop-
erty of being fundamental, target oneness rather than multiplicity. Second, his 
comments regarding the construction of multiple objects make no mention 
of basicness. The existence of multiple basic objects might be vindicated 
were Nietzsche to claim that the world’s parts come prior to the world. But 
no passages on creating objects suggest that the multiplicity of objects works 
to constitute the whole. Rather, as we have seen, there is at least some tex-
tual evidence to think the direction goes the other way. Thus, if Nietzsche 
were to endorse some priority relation between objects, it would most likely 
take the form of priority monism. And, again, that reading faces problems.
4. CONCLUSION
Let me review the major conclusions of this paper. While commentators 
have long debated whether Nietzsche embraces substance monism, his take 
on object monism has largely been left by the wayside. A few readers broach 
the topic, but there has been no detailed investigation in the literature. At 
22 This is obvious if Plato or Spinoza are taken to be priority monists, whereas for Hegel 
the case is less clear. Contemporary priority monists, perhaps most prominently Schaffer, are 
staunchly opposed to the view that objects are brought into existence through our represen-
tational practices.
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first glance, this neglect seems warranted. After all, Nietzsche appears to 
associate monism with nihilism, and monism seems to violate naturalist 
constraints on inquiry. However, I have argued that neither holds weight. 
In fact, Nietzsche even seems to support inf luential arguments for object 
monism. The argument for existence monism Nietzsche appears to endorse 
holds that the world as a concrete whole sufficiently explains all worldly 
phenomena. In response, I suggested that, for Nietzsche, proper parts of 
the world are necessary for explanations of worldly phenomena because 
causal explanations require us to create objects. This implies that Nietzsche 
sides with existence pluralism. The argument for priority monism that 
Nietzsche seems to endorse holds that pluralities of objects exist, but they 
are derived from the whole. I argued that priority monism is compatible 
with Nietzsche’s view that we construct objects. But given that Nietzsche 
thinks objects are created, there is not good reason to think he prefers 
priority monism to some alternative position, such as existence pluralism, 
which stipulates nothing about priority relations between objects. Priority 
relations, along with objects themselves, come into existence through our 
conceptual organization of experience. Nietzsche’s opposition to object 
monism, then, which the secondary literature has more or less taken for 
granted, is certainly not immediately apparent. And although Nietzsche 
might finally come down against object monism, how he does so is also 
quite far from obvious.23
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